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I.  Introduction 
  An empirical evaluation of the college admissions process requires the 
consideration of a series of “decision points” facing both students and colleges.  Students 
must decide to apply to a particular school.  That school, in turn, must decide whether the 
student is accepted or not.  The student must then decide whether or not to accept the 
offer.  Once admitted, the student must navigate several years of study to successfully 
graduate.  Nurnberg, Schapiro and Zimmerman (forthcoming) focused on the 
matriculation decision, developing an empirical model that weighed the importance of a 
variety of factors associated with whether an accepted student opted to attend Williams 
College.
1  In this paper, we shift the emphasis to learn more about the factors associated 
with the loss of admitted students to other competing schools.  That is, we utilize data on 
the head-to-head loss rate for students accepted at Williams, but who opt to enroll 
elsewhere.  For example, we employ data that measure the fraction of students admitted 
to Williams and to Amherst (or Harvard or Yale, etc.) but who opt to attend Amherst (or 
Harvard or Yale, etc.) instead of Williams.  We then model this head-to-head loss rate 
using data from a variety of sources.  A better understanding of the head-to-head loss rate 
can assist an institution in the competition for high quality students.  Importantly, it can 
also shed light on the degree to which some part of the loss rate might be due to 
“intangible” differences between the schools being compared.  These intangibles 
(positive or negative) might grant a school greater success (or failure) in the market for 
                                                 
1 Peter Nurnberg, Morton Schapiro and David Zimmerman, “Students Choosing Colleges:  Understanding 
the Matriculation Decision at a Highly Selective Private Institution,” Economics of Education Review, 
forthcoming.   4
students than an objective accounting of its characteristics might suggest.  Such an 
advantage (or disadvantage) is closely aligned with the business concept of “goodwill.”    
BusinessDictionary.Com defines corporate goodwill as the: 
assumed value of the attractive force that generates sales 
revenue in a business, and adds value to its assets.  Goodwill is 
an intangible but saleable asset, almost indestructible except by 
indiscretion.  It is built painstakingly over the years generally 
with (1) heavy and continuous expenditure in promotion, (2) 
creation and maintenance of durable customer and supplier 
relationships, (3) high quality of goods and services, and (4) 
high quality and conduct of management and employees.  
Goodwill includes the worth of corporate identity, and is 
enhanced by corporate image and a proper location.  Its value is 
not recognized in account books but is realized when the 
business is sold, and is reflected in the firm's selling price by the 
amount in excess over the firm's net worth.  In well established 
firms, goodwill may be worth many times the worth of its 
physical assets.
2 
If this concept is useful in the world of business, it seems reasonable to assume 
that it is important for our most selective private colleges and universities as well.  Have 
some of these schools been more successful than others in promoting their names, in 
building relationships with suppliers such as high schools, in developing alumni loyalty,  
and in developing brand identity?  Do they have intangible assets that make the 
                                                 
2 http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/goodwill.html   5
perception of their quality in excess of that indicated by, say, the accomplishments of 
their faculty, the satisfaction of their students, and the financial success of their alumni?  
Anecdotally, it seems that the goodwill concept is applicable to higher education.  Any 
high school guidance counselor can give you a list of schools that seem to be more than 
the sum of their parts, and others that seem to be less.  In other words, they can intuitively 
name schools with lots of educational goodwill and those with little, none, or negative 
amounts.  We seek here to go beyond intuition and instead to show how a quantitative 
measure of educational goodwill can be computed. 
Our indicator of educational goodwill is based on “customer” behavior.  When 
prospective undergraduates are admitted to two schools, we observe their actual choices 
and then compare them with the ones predicted by the relative strength of each school 
based on “objective” criteria.  The question isn’t whether a particular college or 
university regularly does better in attracting students to its campus as opposed to an 
alternative institution.  The question is whether that school does better than it “should” 
based on a range of indicators that are important to prospective students.  Out of one 
hundred students admitted to schools A and B who end up enrolling at one of those two, 
seventy of them might matriculate at school A.  That doesn’t necessarily indicate 
anything about educational goodwill, since school A might have a much more 
accomplished faculty, a better location, happier students, etc, than school B.  But if 
schools A and B were equivalent in all of those “objective” measures, then we would 
expect that in the absence of educational goodwill, the yield would be 50-50.  The 
difference between an actual 70% yield against school B and a predicted 50% yield   6
indicates the presence of substantial goodwill at school A, with the opposite being the 
case at school B.   
While we present empirical results below, we are under no illusion that we have 
come up with a definitive ranking of elite private colleges and universities in terms of 
goodwill.  The present data set is much too constraining for that.  Instead, our goal is to 
provide a framework for thinking about the value of an institution’s intangibles relative to 
that of its peers.  Our intention is simply to demonstrate how the theory presented here 
can be applied. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section II presents a more 
detailed definition of educational; section III introduces and explains our illustrative 
model; section IV presents our empirical results; section V concludes.   
 
II.  A Definition of Educational Goodwill 
  We conceive of educational in a relative sense – how do perspective students 
value one college’s intangibles versus those of another one – and therefore we need to 
select a benchmark institution.  That institution will be assigned the arbitrary goodwill 
value of zero and all competing institutions will be assigned values relative to the value 
of that baseline institution.  Williams College very generously gave us access to its 
admissions data and is therefore used as the benchmark for this analysis.  Thus, the 
following analysis assigns a goodwill value of zero to Williams and then generates values 
relative to Williams for each of Williams’ peer institutions.   
To conceive of goodwill, we must first measure the value an institution provides 
to its students based on objective criteria.  More accurately, we must measure the value   7
an institution provides to its students relative to the value Williams provides to its 
students.  This means that we must capture the benefits students obtain while they are at 
the school and the expected future job market and career enhancement benefits students 
obtain after they graduate from the school.  We formalize this approach with the 
following mathematical framework.   
Our analysis is driven by loss rates.  In the framework laid out below, the loss rate 
is calculated as follows:   
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By aggregating individual matriculation decisions into Williams’ aggregate loss rate, we 
can construct a meaningful way of thinking about the overall relative attractiveness of 
different institutions.  The higher the loss rate, the more desirable that school is relative to 
Williams.  Our challenge is to decompose this aggregation of attractiveness into its 
component parts – those that come from objective criteria and those that come from 
intangibles. 
The following figure displays the range of Williams’ loss rates to its primary 
competitors (based on a data set explained below) for students who apply for regular 
admission (as opposed to those who apply to a single school under an early admission 
agreement): 
 
Figure 1:  Williams’ Loss Rates to Its Peer Institutions   8
 
While it may be interesting to note that Princeton wins 90% of prospective 
undergraduates in its competition with Williams while Cornell wins only 12%, those 
numbers tell us nothing about which of these schools has more educational goodwill.  In 
order to address that question, we specify the loss rate as a function of two types of 
factors influencing the matriculation decision:  differences in the perceived quality of the 
services provided by institutions and the value of educational goodwill.  In a more formal 
framework, this implies that: 
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Here, Ljw is the loss rate of Williams to school j, and Xj and Xw are respectively vectors of 
college quality variables for institution j and Williams.  Ljw takes on values between 0 and 
100%, although, as explained below, we chose not to limit the predicted loss rates to 
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those bounds.  The variables in the X vectors measure the perceived quality of different 
institutional aspects related to the objective characteristics of those institutions.  β is a 
vector of coefficients.  Under this framework, εjw captures two things:  the institutional 
characteristics related to those benefits that we did not include in the X vectors, plus the 
benefits derived from intangibles.  Thus, the better job we do of including the value of all 
institutional characteristics, the closer εjw comes to measuring the educational goodwill of 
school j relative to that of Williams.  In this framework, the goodwill of an institution is 
Williams’ actual loss rate to that school minus a predicted loss rate that is based on the 
value of objective measures, a metric measured in percentage points. 
 
III.  An Illustrative Model 
  We restrict our illustrative analysis to a relatively large but not exhaustive group 
of Williams’ peer institutions constructed from self-reported student information reported 
to Williams via the Admitted Student Questionnaire (ASQ).  Students who matriculated 
at Williams were asked for the list of other schools that admitted them; students who 
were admitted to Williams but went elsewhere were asked the name of the school where 
the student enrolled.  This is far from a perfect measure of loss rates given that they are 
self-reported.  Ideally, unit record data would be used that contain actual application, 
admission and matriculation information but that would require permission from a range 
of schools which we have thus far been unable to gain.  We then use a 75% random 
sample of the ASQ data reported to Williams for three recent classes.  Per our 
confidentiality agreement with Williams, we do not know which specific years are 
represented in our data set.  We selected our universe of peer institutions by using those   10
schools that are among the thirty-one members of the Consortium on the Financing of 
Higher Education (COFHE) while adding the two additional schools, Bowdoin and 
Middlebury, which were selected over Williams by at least five students according to our 
sample of ASQ data.  Due to data availability problems, we were forced to remove six 
COFHE schools from our sample:  Barnard, Bryn Mawr, Johns Hopkins, Trinity, 
Rochester, and Washington University in St. Louis, ending up with a set of twenty-six 
privates colleges and universities in addition to Williams.
3 
  The variables in this analysis are intended to capture objective institutional 
measures.  These college characteristics break down into three categories:  institutional 
inputs, reported student satisfaction, and perceived investment benefits.  Institutional 
inputs act as a proxy for the quality of the educational product provided by different 
institutions.  In theory, increased inputs per student should improve the quality of the 
education provided by a given institution, with additional inputs translating into enhanced 
classroom and extracurricular experiences.  However, a complication is that some of the 
institutions in our data set are undergraduate colleges with few or no graduate students 
while others are research universities with large numbers of graduate and professional 
school students.  Simply dividing institutional expenditures by the total number of 
students implies that institutions distribute resources evenly between graduate students 
and undergraduates, an assumption that is at odds with the literature.  Instead, we apply a 
disproportionate weight to graduate students in our measure of inputs per student, 
                                                 
3 In alphabetical order, the schools in our sample are Amherst, Bowdoin, Brown, Carleton, Columbia, 
Cornell, Dartmouth, Duke, Georgetown, Harvard, Middlebury, MIT, Mount Holyoke, Northwestern, 
Oberlin, Pomona, Princeton, Rice, Smith, Stanford, Swarthmore, University of Chicago, University of 
Pennsylvania, Wellesley, Wesleyan, and Yale.     11
assuming that each graduate student equals, from a resource use standpoint, 1.5 
undergraduate students.
4   
Student satisfaction variables likely indicate the consumption value of different 
institutions while variables measuring perceived investment benefits are aimed at 
capturing the job market advantages provided by different institutions. 
  Endowment per student (weighted as described above) is a typical measure of 
institutional wealth that presumably is used to enhance undergraduate education broadly 
defined – paying high salaries to attract and retain high-quality professors, providing 
generous financial aid used to maximize peer effects from highly talented students, 
decreasing class sizes, building state of the art facilities, etc.  We also include measures 
of student satisfaction with the academic environment on campus, with the quality of the 
night life and with the weather.  Endowment data (Appendix 1) come from the National 
Association of College and University Business Officers 2007 endowment study while 
student satisfaction data come from the popular (among college applicants) College 
Prowler website (Appendix 2).  College Prowler claims to have “the only college guides 
written by college students for college students.”
5  While other sources provide similar 
rankings based on student feedback, College Prowler is one of the best known and most 
commonly used.  The site ranks a variety of school attributes on a letter based grade scale 
from A+ through F, but the small sample size in this analysis and the collinearity among 
these measures led us to focus on just three of them that intuitively are expected to matter 
                                                 
4As the weight assigned to graduate students increases (say from 1.5 to 2 undergraduates per graduate 
student), research universities in our sample appear to be poorer financially relative to their college 
counterparts.  Our empirical analysis therefore attributes more of the admissions performance at 
universities to educational goodwill as opposed to their objective characteristics.  Hence, the more heavily 
we weigh graduate enrollment, the higher universities rank on the list of educational goodwill presented in 
Table 2.   
5 http://collegeprowler.com/all/   12
to teenagers selecting colleges.  We convert their letter grades into numbers from a value 
of thirteen for an A+ to one for an F.  We expect that students would be attracted, all else 
equal, to colleges and universities with greater student satisfaction (relative to Williams) 
with the academic environment, with the night life on campus and with the weather.   
  Finally, we use starting salary data from PayScale.com’s College Salary Report 
(Appendix 3) to measure the perceived investment benefits associated with different 
institutions.  This variable measures the average earnings of an institution’s graduates one 
year out of college, and presumably indicates the earnings a student might expect if he or 
she matriculated at a particular school.  Of course there are a wide range of problems 
with linking this crude measure to the income prospects any individual student might 
reasonably expect.  It ignores the variance in earnings and the relationship between a 
particular course of study with earnings.  And it ignores the selection biases that plague 
the earnings literature – simply put, more able students tend to pursue more advanced 
levels of education at more selective schools and it is very difficult to determine whether 
observed wage gaps are due to inherent differences in student ability and motivation or to 
differences in the value added provided by one institution as opposed to another.  
Fortunately, our concern here is not to analyze the contribution of schools to lifetime 
earnings.  We don’t care about the actual return to education, only about the return 
perceived by college applicants at the time of their matriculation decisions.  It seems 
unreasonable to expect even the most precocious college applicant to be familiar with the 
econometrics literature on the return to human capital investments.  If prospective 
students look at the starting salary data and use this information in selecting schools, it 
doesn’t particularly matter to us if the numbers are good or bad indicators of economic   13
returns.  The higher the value of this measure relative to Williams, the more attractive an 
institution is expected to be, thereby raising the Williams loss rate.   
As stated in the introduction, we make no claim about creating a definitive 
ranking of educational goodwill.  We readily acknowledge that this empirical framework 
is plagued by response bias in the ASQ data, the arbitrary nature of the weighting used to 
standardize the wealth measure across schools, the use of Williams as the sole reference 
school, limitations in the extent to which our proxy variables capture components of 
institutional attractiveness, and numerous other problems, some of which come with a 
small sample size.  The analysis presented here is provided for illustrative purposes, 
giving a concrete example of how the theory we presented above can be applied.  Thus, 
the actual numbers presented below are less important than the conceptual theory they 
illustrate. 
 
IV.  Empirical Analysis 
  We conduct our analysis by fitting the variables discussed in section III into the 
framework summarized by equation (1).  We use the following model specification, 
breaking down the X vector into five components.   
 
Ljw  = β0 + β1(Endowmentj – Endowmentw) + β2(Academicsj – Academicsw) +  β3(Night 
Lifej – Night Lifew)+ β4(Weatherj – Weatherw) + β5(StartSalaryj – StartSalaryw) +  
εjw 
 
The estimation results are as follows:     14
 
Table 1:  The Loss Rate Model 
Dependent Variable:  Loss Rate (in percentage points) 
N=26, R
2 =.80, F=16.0 
 
Endowment   2.46
***  
                  (0.74) 
Academics              7.32  
                  (4.44) 
Night Life              1.28  
                  (1.41) 
Weather              -.32  
                  (1.41) 
StartSalary             1.64
*** 
                  (0.49) 
Constant            32.40
*** 
                  (7.32) 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
***indicates significance at the 1% level 
 
 
While the student satisfaction measures are statistically insignificant, the other 
two variables are significant at the 1% level and this simple model explains 80% of the 
variation in loss rates between Williams and the other schools in the sample.  Recall that 
the reported variables are the difference between the value for a given institution and the 
value for Williams.  We divided the endowment per capita variable by 100,000 and the 
starting salary variable by 1,000 to facilitate the interpretation of the results.  Thus, the 
coefficients on those variables respectively indicate the change in Williams’ loss rate to a 
given institution when the difference between the institution’s endowment per capita 
(weighted as described above) and Williams’ endowment per capita rises by $100,000 or 
the difference between the starting salaries of a school’s alumni and the starting salaries 
of Williams’ alumni increases by $1,000.  Therefore, a $100,000 increase in weighted   15
endowment per student between another school and Williams increases the Williams loss 
rate to that school by almost two and a half percentage points while every $1,000 addition 
in starting salary at a rival school relative to Williams leads to an increase in the Williams 
loss rate to that school by around a percentage point and a half. 
  As discussed above, we compute educational goodwill by solving for the 
residual.  Unfortunately, it is likely that the error term includes the impact of both 
intangibles and of those relevant institutional characteristics that are not captured by the 
variables in the model.  But for illustrative purposes, we assume that educational 
goodwill comprises the entire residual – the actual loss rate minus the loss rate predicted 
in the model.  The predicted loss rates are displayed in Figure 2 while the differences 
between the actual and predicted values are shown in Figure 3.  Recall that all of these 
measures of goodwill are calculated relative to the goodwill at Williams College, and 
therefore the value for Williams is zero. 
 
   16
Figure 2:  Loss Rates Predicted by the Model 
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Upon first inspection, it might seem problematic that three of these predicted loss rates 
are negative.  While it is possible for 100% of the students who are admitted to both 
Wesleyan and Williams and end up matriculating at one of those two schools to go to 
Williams, it isn’t possible for 106% of those students to go to Williams.  However, by 
allowing predicted loss rates less than zero, we are better able to distinguish among 
schools at the very low end of the yield range against Williams.  While according to this 
model, several schools should have very low predicted yields relative to Williams (with 
Smith at 5% and Carleton at 3%), the fact that Mount Holyoke has a predicted value of  
-1%, Oberlin is at -2% and Wesleyan is at -6% indicates that based on the institutional 
characteristics included in this model, those schools should do even worse against   17
Williams than Carleton should.  If we constrained all predicted values to the zero to 100 
interval, that distinction would be largely lost. 
  Figure 3 displays our measure of educational goodwill, computed as the 
difference between the actual and predicted loss rates. 
 
Figure 3:  Computed Educational Goodwill  
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These magnitudes are listed in order in Table 2. 
 
Table 2:  Computed Educational Goodwill Rankings and Amounts 
 
Ranking School
Goodwill 
(Percentage Points)
1B r o w n 2 3 %
2C o l u m b i a 2 3 %
3Y a l e 1 8 %
4H a r v a r d 1 5 %
5 U Pennsylvania 15%
6 Mount Holyoke 12%
7 Oberlin 9%
8W e s l e y a n 8 %
9D a r t m o u t h 8 %
10 Stanford 6%
11 Carleton 4%
12 Wellesley 3%
13 Williams 0%
14 Princeton -1%
15 Middlebury -2%
16 Smith -5%
17 MIT -5%
18 Northwestern -6%
19 Bowdoin -7%
20 Cornell -9%
21 Pomona -10%
22 Georgetown -11%
23 Swarthmore -14%
24 Duke -15%
25 U Chicago -15%
26 Amherst -16%
27 Rice -28%  
 
 
The key insight from this analysis is that some schools do considerably better 
against Williams in the competition for undergraduate students than the schools’ 
fundamental characteristics (or at least those captured in the model) suggest that they 
should.  Others do much worse.  The order of this list deserves some comment.  Why, for 
example, is Wellesley, a school to which Williams has only a 17% loss rate, ranked   19
above MIT, a school to which Williams has a 75% loss rate?  The reason is simple.  The 
model suggests that based on objective criteria, Williams “should” have a 14% loss rate 
to Wellesley and an 80% loss rate to MIT.  Hence, Williams does better than it “should” 
against MIT (the actual loss rate minus the predicted one is negative five percentage 
points) and worse than it “should” against Wellesley (the actual loss rate minus the 
predicted one is positive three percentage points).  So Wellesley is ranked above 
Williams in educational goodwill (#12 versus #13) while MIT at #17 is below.   
  This analysis does not seek to provide any insights into the sources generating 
educational goodwill.  However, despite our caveat about not putting much stock into our 
particular empirical results, an obvious observation is that six of the eight members of the 
Ivy League do even better than expected in this analysis, with Brown topping our list of 
educational goodwill and Columbia, Yale, Harvard and Penn right behind.  Perhaps the 
Ivy label provides some brand value that generates a competitive admissions advantage 
over and above that attributable to the objective characteristics of those schools.  That 
intuitive hypothesis needs to be tested within a more rigorous empirical analysis.    
 
V.  Conclusion 
  The purpose of this paper is to provide a framework to introduce the idea of 
educational goodwill.  By accounting for a school’s undergraduate attractiveness based 
on its objective characteristics, and then comparing actual yields against expected ones, 
we have attempted to tease out the presence of intangibles.  If businesses can be worth 
more or less than the sum of their parts, so may colleges and universities.  Returning to 
the definition provided at the start of the paper, and moving from business to academe,   20
goodwill in the academic context is the value of the attractive force that generates 
applications and matriculations and adds value to a school’s assets.  It is built 
painstakingly over the years and includes the worth of an institution’s identity.   Our hope 
is that other researchers will improve on the preliminary empirical work presented here, 
adding to our understanding of this potentially important yet previously unaddressed 
phenomenon.    21
Appendix 1:  Weighted Endowment Per Capita
6 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Based on data from the National Association of College and University Business Officers 2007 
endowment study.  Each graduate and professional school student is weighted as 1.5 undergraduates. 
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¹ These endowment per capita numbers were substantially altered by the financial market turmoil in the Fall of 2008.    22
Appendix 2:  College Prowler Rankings
7 
        Academics  Night Life       Weather 
A m h e r s t      A -    B    C +    
Bowdoin     A   C-   C- 
B r o w n       A    B +    C  
Carleton     B+   B-   C- 
C o l u m b i a      A -    A    B -  
Cornell    B+   C+   D 
Dartmouth     A   D   C 
D u k e       A    C +    B  
Georgetown     A   A-   B- 
Harvard     A   A-   C- 
M i d d l e b u r y      A    D +    C -  
M I T       A +    A -    C -  
Mount  Holyoke    A-   C   C+ 
Northwestern     A-   C+   D 
O b e r l i n     A -    C -    C +  
P o m o n a      A -    B -    A  
P r i n c e t o n      A +    C    B -  
R i c e       A -    A    B -  
S m i t h       A -    C +    C +  
S t a n f o r d      A +    B    A -  
S w a r t h m o r e      A    B -    B -  
University  of  Chicago    A   B   D 
University  of  Pennsylvania   A-   A-   B- 
W e l l e s l e y      A -    B    C -  
Wesleyan     B+   C-   C+ 
Williams     A   D   C- 
Y a l e       A    B -    C +
                                                 
7 Source:  College Prowler via the College Confidential Website 
(http://talk.collegeconfidential.com/visits/college_rank_summary.html)   23
Appendix 3:  Payscale.com Salary Rankings
8  
 
 
                                                 
8 Source:  Payscale.com (http://www.payscale.com/best-colleges/top-salary.asp) 
School
Starting Median Salary 
(StartSalary)
MIT $72,200
Stanford University 70,400
Princeton University 66,500
Rice University 64,000
Harvard University 63,400
University of Pennsylvania 60,900
Cornell University 60,300
Columbia University 59,400
Yale University 59,100
Duke University 58,900
Dartmouth College 58,000
Brown University 56,200
Georgetown University 55,000
Amherst College 54,500
University of Chicago 53,400
Northwestern University 52,700
Williams 51,700
Swarthmore College 49,700
Pomona College 48,600
Bowdoin College 48,100
Middlebury College 47,700
Carleton College 47,500
Wesleyan University 46,500
Smith College 44,000
Oberlin College 43,400
Wellesley College 42,800
Mount Holyoke College 42,400